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From the ‘Quiet Revolution’ to 
‘Crisis’ in Australian Indigenous 
Affairs
Virginia Watson
On 26 March 2005, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (ATSIC) formally came to end, its abolition the 
capstone of a much longer process initiated by the Howard 
government when it assumed power in 1996. The process 
began rhetorically, with government ministers and the Prime 
Minister, John Howard, incessantly questioning the legacy of 
self-determination, and of Indigenous corporate, communal 
and individual capacity. By 2004, this critique had been 
institutionalised. Indigenous policy development, program 
and service delivery organised around the goal of ‘practical 
reconciliation’ was ‘mainstreamed’. Shared responsibility 
agreements (SRAs) between the federal government and 
individual Indigenous communities formed the new basis 
for the distribution of discretionary federal funding. This 
‘whole of government’ approach, together with the idea that 
Indigenous citizens and communities would be co-responsible 
for their own welfare, linked philosophical commitments and 
an underlying moral critique of Indigenous agency to insti-
tutional change. In 2005, Senator Amanda Vanstone termed 
these changes ‘a quiet revolution’.
Within a year the ‘quiet revolution’ had turned into a 
‘crisis’. The then-new Minister for Family and Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs, Mal Brough, toured ‘town 
camps’ on the outskirts of Alice Springs and the ‘long grass’ in 
Darwin in the first half of May 2006—returning a week later to 
take part in one of the town camp night patrols. He and other 
government ministers delivered an ongoing commentary for 
the benefit of the media, decrying the ‘dysfunction’, ‘violence’, 
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‘substance abuse’, ‘alcoholism’, ‘poverty’, ‘unemployment’ and 
critically poor health of these Indigenous communities. The 
public scandal might have dissipated fairly quickly. Most 
‘revelations’ of deprivation in Indigenous communities are 
short-lived media events that scandalise a public enough to 
want to read or listen to network coverage for a day or two, but 
which invariably get overtaken by the next round of current 
affairs. However, this was not what happened.
In May 2006, the Crown Prosecutor in Alice Springs 
appeared in an interview on national television to voice her 
concerns about what she understood to be the widespread, 
long-term, violent abuse of Indigenous women and children 
by Indigenous men, and the failure of the law and other 
institutions to respond appropriately to this criminal behav-
iour. The Treasurer, Peter Costello, together with Brough, 
responded by decrying the use of ‘tribal’ law, declaring that 
the restoration of law and order in these communities was 
now the government’s priority in Indigenous Affairs. Then, 
as if to demonstrate the correctness of this new focus, long-
running tensions within the Northern Territory community 
of Wadeye (Thamarrurr) hit the press and airwaves. Stories of 
‘gang violence’ and a community held hostage to these ‘gangs’ 
prompted claims by some (including some town residents) 
that an emergency evacuation of those hostaged residents was 
imperative.
There was never an evacuation of Wadeye. But the 
idea that there was a ‘crisis’ taking place in Indigenous 
communities across the Australian continent took hold of 
public discourse. Media attention focused on the ‘violence’, 
‘dysfunction’, the ‘morass’, ‘emergency’, ‘social crisis’ and 
‘depravity’ in remote Aboriginal communities. The term ‘crisis’ 
frequently organised the coverage and commentary, not 
just of tabloid journalists or shock jocks, but also the federal 
political leadership itself, as well as many other commentators 
with backgrounds that range from long-term experience in 
Indigenous Affairs to those with more recent and superficial 
engagement.
In this essay, I suggest that claims about ‘crisis’ in 
Indigenous communities should not be seen as a straightfor-
ward outcome of empirical circumstance, even though this 
V i r g i n i a  w a t s o n  :  ‘ q u i e t  r e V o l u t i o n ’  t o  ‘ c r i s i s ’
333
appears in many ways to be verified by ‘objective’ statistical 
data and the ‘subjective’ testimony of many Indigenous people 
themselves. The idea of crisis does not derive naturally from 
such accounts of Indigenous circumstance. Rather, it is clear 
that the federal political leadership in fact orchestrated events, 
particularly throughout the month of May 2006, by transform-
ing the government’s failure to change the fundamentals of 
Indigenous welfare —its ‘quiet revolution’ and commitment 
to ‘practical reconciliation’—into a widespread, general crisis. 
This ‘crisis’ became a turning point at which the discourse 
of government responsibility for citizens was overtaken and 
replaced by that of citizen responsibility to government, 
namely, that Indigenous people and communities themselves 
are now equally responsible for (governmental) failure in 
Indigenous Affairs.
Crisis, within such an account, needs to be understood as 
a process. And while the idea of crisis has proliferated to the 
point that it seems to represent a key concept of modernity,1 
crisis situations do not naturally grow from objective condi-
tions of threat. Instead, politicians and citizens narrate social 
problems or shifts of power in ways that project them as 
critical moments in history that signal disaster. Crises, then, 
as the political scientist Colin Hay has argued, are constituted 
in and through particular narratives, they are ‘subjectively 
perceived and hence brought into existence through narrative 
and discourse … Crises are representations and hence “con-
structions” of failure.’2 
The capacity of the Australian Government to render the 
present moment in terms of crisis needs to be seen as one 
point along a discursive continuum. Along this continuum, 
contradictory forms of thought and practices are made coher-
ent. On the one hand, the social, economic and political issues 
entangled with Indigenous marginalisation are defined as 
requiring Indigenous people themselves to take responsibility 
for their structurally peripheral circumstance —citizen re-
sponsibility eclipses citizenship rights. On the other hand, this 
definition of crisis frames the circumstances of Indigenous 
experience in ways that provide the non-Indigenous political 
leadership with the key to defining the appropriate strategies 
for resolution of ‘the crisis’—here, the restoration of law 
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and order is defined as the fundamental solution. That this 
particular conjuncture has made possible the narrative 
construction of crisis is an outcome of the contingent coupling 
of these discursive positions.
In examining the development of this narrative of crisis, I 
make two points. First, in the conception of crisis as deriving 
naturally from inherent features of Indigenous culture, com-
munity and individual behaviour, we fail to grasp the crucial, 
active and material role that the Commonwealth and other 
government and non-government agencies have played in the 
emergence of this crisis. Governmental fiscal neglect needs to 
be understood as one of the key factors producing the often 
critical conditions of daily life in communities such as Wadeye 
(Thamarrurr). 
Second, the Howard government’s declared solution to 
the crisis—the restoration of law and order—grossly underes-
timated the nature of the problem and scope of solutions and 
public resources required. It is certainly clear that national 
governments generally are unwilling to deal with increased 
inequality—it is no longer possible to mount arguments that 
will have any purchase along the lines that that the state has 
full responsibility for the welfare of disadvantaged citizens. 
However, in the case of remote Indigenous communities, the 
opportunity costs of maintaining the status quo have been 
calculated, and there is no argument, economic or political, 
that this situation is sustainable. There are, instead, alterna-
tive models as well as current practices organised broadly 
around notions of economic, cultural and social sustainability 
that make possible the long-term viability of communities 
such as Wadeye (Thamarrurr).
Although policy and discourse are often thought of as 
separate spheres of activity, this separation is misleading. 
They are better understood as effectively one and the same 
thing, in that they are bound up with each other in constitut-
ing a particular field of discursive practice. This essay charts 
the contours of this field of discursive practice.
Naturalising crisis
When John Howard came to power, the new political 
leadership began—slowly at first, and then with increased 
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vigour—to develop a narrative about the ‘failure’ of national 
policy and administration in Indigenous Affairs over the 
previous two decades. As is well known, that policy period, 
and the administrative and representative structures and 
processes it spawned, were organised around the principles 
of ‘self-determination’/‘self-management’ and a bipartisan 
commitment to the elimination of racial discrimination and 
the protection of human rights. The former was institution-
alised in the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, and the latter in 
the creation of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission (HREOC). During this twenty-year period, 
‘self-determination’ was represented by supporters and critics 
alike as signifying a clear ‘break’ from the era of ‘assimilation’ 
which had preceded it.
When the first Minister for Indigenous Affairs in the 
Howard government, John Herron, was appointed, he also 
maintained this idea of a rupture. However, he articulated a 
critical negative account of ‘self-determination’, suggesting 
that there was much merit in assimilationist ideas and 
the administrative regimes established during that era. 
Herron’s apparent support for a ‘return to assimilation’ was 
coupled with an ongoing critique concerning the ‘failure’ of 
‘separate’ Indigenous institutions, programs and services to 
deliver improvements in the socioeconomic circumstances 
of Indigenous populations across the country. Remote 
Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory who had 
benefited from Commonwealth land rights legislation and 
community government, but who were now said to be ‘land 
rich and dirt poor’, were singled out for particular attention 
in this critical narrative. However, so as not to confine the cri-
tique to the Northern Territory—Indigenous socioeconomic 
indicators are appalling in all states—the federal government 
expanded its long-held criticism of ATSIC.
All these criticisms of the legacy of ‘self-determination’, 
developed in the first three years of the Howard govern-
ment’s term, are well documented and analysed.3 Many 
commentators (Indigenous and non-Indigenous) worried 
that the government was signalling a ‘return to assimilation’. 
However, the government framed its ‘new’ approach to policy 
and administration in terms of ‘practical reconciliation’. This 
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appeared at least in rhetorical terms to signal continuity as 
opposed to discontinuity with the previous policy era.4
‘Practical reconciliation’ built upon a direct critique of the 
Keating government’s legacy of ‘reconciliation’ and, more 
indirectly, on a critique of the idea of ‘self-determination’. 
Howard and other ministers argued that the Keating decade 
of ‘reconciliation’ had been too concerned with ‘symbolic’ 
questions;5 Howard’s focus would instead be on ‘practical’ 
outcomes in Indigenous health, education, welfare, income 
and employment. Achieving statistical equality between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians was seen by 
Howard to be the eventual goal of ‘practical reconciliation’.
All these developments in Indigenous affairs under 
Howard need to be seen as coextensive with wider and longer-
term national, international and global transformations, 
many of which began during the late 1970s and early 1980s.6 In 
the national context, the reform of social welfare more broadly 
has been underscored by the McLure report7 and driven by 
the notion of ‘mutual obligation’ and the restructuring of the 
welfare sector. This has entailed a complex process of ‘enter-
prising’ both the state and its citizens, particularly those who 
are recipients of welfare.8 Public sector agencies (formerly the 
primary providers of welfare programs and services), non-
government organisations and the private sector now compete 
with one another to provide at the most competitive rates, 
programs and services to the recipients of welfare. At the same 
time, those citizens who are recipients of welfare are also 
required to conduct themselves in more ‘enterprising’ ways, 
actively undertaking designated work projects in exchange for 
unemployment and other welfare benefits.
Furthermore, all these efforts by policy makers to recon-
figure the relationship between society, state, economy and 
citizen have, at the same time, also reconfigured geography 
and territory. Localities facing sustained economic hardship 
are now required to sort out their own problems, especially 
through the route of ‘rebuilding local community’, ‘building 
community capacity’, ‘bridging social capital’—key terms 
in the contemporary vocabulary of ‘welfare reform’ in this 
geographic guise.9 
V i r g i n i a  w a t s o n  :  ‘ q u i e t  r e V o l u t i o n ’  t o  ‘ c r i s i s ’
337
At the international level, the transfer and exchange of 
these reforming ideas and practices in welfare and social 
policy has been productive and has cross-cut liberal, conserva-
tive and neo-conservative ideological commitments. For 
example, Blair Labour’s ‘Third Way’ in the United Kingdom, 
the ‘compassionate conservatism’ of the Bush administration 
in the United States, and ‘mutual obligation’ and ‘mutual 
responsibility’ of the Howard government, whilst configured 
in nationally unique ways all stress the obligations of citizens 
to government as a critical element of welfare reform.10 The 
idea that Indigenous Australians needed to assume greater 
responsibility for themselves and their circumstances is 
clearly to be located within this wider and longer-term context. 
To suggest that there is a social crisis unfolding across 
Indigenous communities is in many ways not an entirely 
new strategic intervention by government. This analysis was 
not confined to government sources or those commentators 
who identified as supporters of the federal government. 
Indigenous community leaders and commentators, and many 
non-Indigenous analysts, have been frank about the critical 
social conditions in Indigenous communities, as well as the 
relationship between these circumstances and individual and 
corporate/communal responsibility. Some of this commentary 
has indeed lent credibility to the governmental narrative of 
crisis. However, this does not appear to have been the inten-
tion of these analyses. Rather, these critiques have aimed to 
urge governments to take more seriously a range of cultural, 
ethnographic and historical factors in policy making, service 
delivery and institutional arrangements as they are configured 
for Indigenous communities, rather than supporting a simple 
moral critique of Indigenous ‘failure’. I want to look in par-
ticular at two examples of this critique, not only for the ways 
in which they raise crucial issues associated with Indigenous 
corporate and individual agency, but also for the ways in 
which these raise crucial issues to do with the active role of 
government action itself, over many decades, in constructing 
and sustaining the current circumstances of daily life in many 
Indigenous communities.
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‘Bringing the state back in’: Noel Pearson’s critique11
The first example of this critique is that developed by the 
Indigenous activist and policy consultant, Noel Pearson, one 
of the most prominent critics of the active, historical role 
that governments have played in developing Indigenous 
disadvantage and marginalisation. Pearson argues that the 
extension of welfare payments to Indigenous citizens over the 
past three decades has produced a debilitating dependency 
and widespread social dysfunction—specifically among the 
communities of Cape York.12 The welfare economy that has 
developed in the region, Pearson observes, is inimical to 
traditional Aboriginal culture as much as it is to the economy 
of the market.13 As Pearson puts it:
The problem with the welfare economy is that it is not a 
real economy. It is a completely artificial means of living. 
Our traditional economy was and is a real economy. 
Central to the traditional economy was the imperative for 
able-bodied people to work. If you did not hunt and gather, 
you starved … Common to the real economy of traditional 
society and the real economy of the market is the demand 
for economic and social reciprocity. This reciprocity is 
expressed through work, initiative, struggle, enterprise, 
contribution, effort. The key problem with welfare is that it 
inherently does not demand reciprocity. I call it a gammon 
economy.14
According to Pearson, if the debilitating effects of the welfare 
economy are ever going to be overcome, the reinvigoration 
of reciprocity as the basis of social relations is crucial. For 
this to be possible, new institutional arrangements must be 
established. Pearson argues that service delivery to Aboriginal 
communities has proved extremely problematic on the ground, 
and that while government certainly has the resources to 
commit to services and programs, its modus operandi lacks 
coordination, encourages overlap and duplication, and is not 
based on holistic approaches. Simply attempting to address 
the manifest problems in Cape York Aboriginal communities 
through better coordination of programs and other adjust-
ments that generally take place under the rubric of ‘whole 
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of government’ approaches to service delivery will be totally 
inadequate to deal with the scale of the problems and needs 
in those communities. From Pearson’s perspective, the idea of 
better coordination still assumes that welfare-induced prob-
lems can be solved through more effective program delivery 
under policies that are usually developed by bureaucrats far 
removed from these communities.
In other words, from Pearson’s perspective, government 
itself continues to be an active source of the negative welfare 
mentality. What is required to fully tackle the problems that 
confront Cape York communities is, according to Pearson, a 
new interface with government, a statutory authority between 
Cape York peoples and government to coordinate holistic 
policy development, planning and the administration and de-
livery of welfare programs at regional, sub-regional and local 
levels. This new statutory interface will operate as a ‘partner-
ship interface’, through which ‘the state would negotiate with 
Aboriginal community representatives … about the design of 
programs and the development of cooperative agreements on 
how the programs will be delivered on the ground’.15
Some commentators have seen Pearson’s arguments as 
supporting the Howard government’s commitment to welfare 
policy and payments premised upon the notion of citizen 
responsibility.16 However, such accounts are misleading; 
they ignore, first, Pearson’s critique of the ongoing, active 
role of the state in perpetuating welfare dependence —and 
this includes the Howard government’s focus on mutual 
responsibility and mainstreamed, whole-of-government 
approaches to policy and service delivery. Second, they 
overlook his arguments for the creation of new institutional 
arrangements through which the relationship between the 
state and Indigenous citizens should be configured. For 
Pearson, welfare has been debilitating because of the way 
in which it has been directed to Indigenous people. Pearson 
argues that systemic changes are essential in terms of the way 
in which welfare is distributed, but he does not see welfare per 
se as debilitating. Rather, welfare provides potentially valuable 
resources for the development of remote Aboriginal communi-
ties if genuine partnerships are established with government, 
developed under the new institutional arrangements he 
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proposes replace the current arrangements which are wholly 
controlled by government. In 2006, six years on from the 
publication of his monograph Our Right to Take Responsibility, 
it was hardly surprising (although dreadfully depressing) to 
hear Pearson state that for all the negotiations he has been 
involved in over the years with federal and state governments 
to bring about the changes he has argued for, almost no 
change has been the result.17
Anthropological critique: David Martin
Anthropologist David Martin draws on his own ethnographic 
work in the Cape York region as well as that of other 
anthropologists to suggest that there are certain widespread 
Aboriginal values and practices which may be inimical to the 
kinds of social and attitudinal changes sought by Pearson and 
the Howard government in advocating an end to welfare de-
pendency. First, as Martin shows, the notion of ‘dependency’, 
which lies at the core of both Pearson’s and governmental as-
sessments of the effects of welfare, is not necessarily one that 
would have much meaning for many Indigenous people living 
in remote communities. ‘Dependency’ here is understood in 
terms of a ‘culturally established and validated capacity to 
demand and receive resources and services (symbolic and 
tangible) from others’.18 Seen this way, not only is dependency 
not inimical to individual and group autonomy, it is ‘a core 
principle through which Aboriginal agency is realised in the 
structuring of social relationships’.19 
What appears as ‘objective disparities in wealth and power’, 
both within Aboriginal groups and between Aboriginal people 
and the wider society, can, as Martin states, ‘be transformed 
by Aboriginal agency through a process of co-opting oth-
ers, often outsiders (including non-Aboriginal people) to 
become patrons or “bosses” for Aboriginal people’.20 This 
establishes a complex set of relations: from the perspective of 
those Aboriginal people involved, relationships of so-called 
‘dependency’ are relationships of obligation and responsibil-
ity to those same Aboriginal agents. This ethnographically 
informed understanding of Aboriginal sociality has perplexed 
proponents of ‘self-determination’ no less than advocates of 
mutual and individual responsibility in the sense that both 
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have sought to develop active Indigenous agents in terms that 
clearly have little resonance with Aboriginal peoples’ expecta-
tions or experience.21 
Martin is also concerned that Pearson’s principle of 
reciprocity and the related notion of mutual responsibility as 
he uses it, while quite different from that used by the Howard 
government, will also founder against certain Aboriginal so-
cial values and practices. For Pearson, because the state is too 
remote from Indigenous experience, efforts to strengthen in-
dividual responsibility need to be organised around the idea of 
reciprocity and mutual responsibility between the individual 
and his or her ‘family’, local group and ‘community’—and not 
between individuals or communities and the state. However, 
as Martin shows, neither ‘families’ nor ‘communities’ can be 
assumed to be units of sufficient moral and political authority 
capable of instituting the kinds of reciprocity and responsibil-
ity for which Pearson argues. In the case of ‘families’, the value 
of individual autonomy means that ‘it is rare even for a senior 
individual to be able to exercise authority across all members 
of a family, particularly in relation to the matters about 
which Pearson is most concerned—expenditure of individual 
incomes, care of children, consumption of alcohol, and so 
forth’.22 In the case of ‘communities’, there are few if any 
Indigenous-wide community political institutions which exist 
apart from the quasi-local community government councils 
and regional councils (such as land councils). These bodies 
represent highly complex and internally differentiated popula-
tions in terms of factors that continue to inform Aboriginal 
political, economic and social relations such as affiliations 
with ancestral lands and language, personal and group 
histories, ethnicity and, bearing on all of these, kin group and 
other local affiliations. Consequently, although community 
government councils have legislative responsibility for the 
general peace, welfare and health of community residents, 
they cannot be considered to have the necessary political or 
moral authority to demand responsibility and reciprocity from 
residents.
Finally, in relation to Pearson’s conception of the rela-
tionship between the cash flows into communities through 
welfare payments and CDEP, and the manifestations of social 
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pathology, Martin points out that there is a complex interplay 
between the social processes involved in increasing individu-
ation on the one hand, and of enduring forms of collective 
action on the other. Where Pearson imagines that the source 
of the cash provides a moral force which is manifest in the way 
in which it is used by individuals—‘you value the things you 
work for’23—ethnographic evidence suggests rather that there 
is ‘a more complex interaction between individuals’ values and 
practices, and those of their significant social networks as well 
as those of the community in which they live’.24 Although cash 
has only become widely available to Aboriginal people living 
in remote communities in the last thirty to thirty-five years, it 
has nonetheless become ‘deeply implicated in the production 
and reproduction of [the] distinctive Aboriginal values and 
practices’ that lie at the heart of the issues that concern 
Pearson, and which are the subject of the highly moralising 
governmental discourse concerning citizen responsibility.25 
Money, Martin argues, ‘has become central to a particular 
kind of Aboriginal “performative sociality”, in which social 
relations (notably those of kinship) are constantly produced 
and reproduced through the flows of services and material 
items between individuals’, while, at the same time, money 
has enabled individuals to abstract themselves from many of 
those same relationships of kin-relatedness and responsibility. 
What this means in terms of the uses to which money is put 
by recipients of welfare is complex. On the one hand, welfare 
payments enable the deepening of collective actions within 
Aboriginal groups (through collective saving for consumer 
items such as vehicles, for example, and the financing of large 
ceremonial gatherings as well as resourcing drinking and 
gambling groups). On the other hand, welfare and cash make 
possible more autonomous action by individuals who want to 
assert their independence from others within their significant 
social networks. What all this implies for policy makers and 
governments, then, is that it is not possible to make clear-cut 
normative assessments about the effects of welfare payments 
and socially destructive behaviour. Rather, the availability 
of cash in the form of welfare payments can facilitate both 
constructive and destructive activity.In sum, the ‘responsible’ 
Indigenous citizen constructed by the Howard government, 
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like the ‘self-determining’ Indigenous citizen26 of previous 
governments, is not only a simplistic rendition of the cultural 
and social complexity described by anthropologists such as 
Martin. Government policy in fact actively contributes to the 
reproduction of those critical circumstances of daily life in 
remote Aboriginal communities, reproducing programs and 
policy that fail to engage with those Indigenous values and 
practices that can prove so problematic for the health, well-
being and development of individuals and communities.27 
Governance as a multi-sited activity
To speak here of the active role of ‘government’ in reproduc-
ing Indigenous disadvantage is to gloss into homogeneity 
what is in fact an altogether ‘heterogeneous ensemble of 
institutions’.28 This assemblage of organisations and agencies 
comprises not only federal, state and local government agen-
cies—as well as non-government organisations—but also, 
most significantly, thousands of publicly funded Indigenous 
organisations or, as Tim Rowse refers to them collectively, the 
‘Indigenous sector’. Furthermore, this very diverse governmen-
tal/organisational terrain means that there is no longer any 
sense (if there ever was) in which policy-making processes and 
practices can be understood to be coherent projects.
As the anthropologist Dianne Smith puts it, policy-making 
processes and practices are not only multi-sited, they are 
increasingly complex in their manifestations, values, princi-
ples, structure and agency, and do not necessarily cohere in 
the ways in which many commentators are prone to suggest.29 
Smith has argued that as Indigenous groups have asserted 
their own cultural values and priorities and inaugurated 
their own civil and legal structures, we need to understand 
that the state no longer monopolises policy-making power. 
Policy ‘solutions’ to the ‘problem’ of Indigenous disadvantage 
now pose difficult dilemmas not only for non-Indigenous 
bureaucrats and politicians, but for an expanding class 
of Indigenous policy makers as well.30 By factoring these 
institutional transformations into our thinking about policy 
making, Smith argues that policy is no longer a matter of 
choosing between competing paradigms organised around 
the idea of cultural difference —how to eradicate it if you were/
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are an assimilationist, and how to preserve it if you were/are 
committed to ‘self-determination’. Rather, as she puts it, ‘the 
[current] dilemma for policy makers is not so much the need 
to recognize cultural values and diversity, but how to respond 
to these in the formulation of programs without degenerating 
into social engineering. This is a dilemma for Indigenous as 
well as non-Indigenous policy makers.’31 
While these issues of Indigenous ‘welfare dependency’ and 
the ‘destructive’ uses made of welfare payments by some re-
cipients of those benefits form the basis of much of the debate 
about the ‘crisis’ in remote Aboriginal communities, there 
is, of course, a crucial element missing from this narrative. 
Government funding and the fiscal responsibility of the state 
is rarely the focus of attention in these debates, and to the 
extent that it is, it is usually in terms of government largesse in 
relation to Aboriginal communities, not governmental fiscal 
neglect. However, the data that are widely available reveal 
large and persistent shortfalls in government expenditure 
on infrastructure and services in Aboriginal communities. 
Although it is also the case that the federal government is 
failing to make adequate provision for infrastructure across 
the country more generally,32 the research that demonstrates 
large shortfalls in expenditure on Indigenous communities 
receives little-to-no media attention. The sustaining fiction 
that government overspends on Indigenous programs and 
services is, it would seem, strengthened by public awareness 
of under-spending on infrastructure across the country more 
generally. Furthermore, this research also reveals a structural 
imbalance in funding in expenditure across Indigenous affairs, 
with proportionally much less being spent on positive aspects 
of public policy such as education and employment creation, 
and proportionally more being spent on negative areas such 
as criminal justice and unemployment benefits. One study 
focused on Wadeye and its satellite homelands and outsta-
tions makes this explicit.33 
The cost of sustaining the status quo
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) commis-
sioned economists John Taylor and Owen Stanley to produce 
an account of the costs—both to governments and to the 
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local community—of sustaining the status quo in the Wadeye 
region. The ‘opportunity costs’—the costs arising from 
forgone production and from remedial actions necessary to 
compensate for critical socioeconomic conditions—identified 
by Taylor and Stanley show just how unsustainable that status 
quo is. Key findings of their report include the fact that far 
less is spent on residents of the region, per head, than on the 
average Territorian; for example ‘for every education dollar 
spent by governments on the average child of compulsory 
school age in the Northern Territory, at present $0.47 is spent 
on the Thamarrurr equivalent’.
One might expect that the remedial costs to government 
of servicing a growing Australian community that is relatively 
sick, poorly housed, illiterate, innumerate, disengaged from 
the education system, on low income, unemployed and with a 
sub-standard communications network would be substantially 
higher (not lower) than the Northern Territory average. What 
emerges instead is something akin to Hart’s oft-cited inverse 
care law in relation to health care needs—‘to those most in 
need the least is provided’. Furthermore, there is a structural 
imbalance in funding at Thamarrurr with proportionally 
less expenditure on positive aspects of public policy such 
as education and employment creation that are designed 
to build capacity and increase output, and proportionally 
more spending on negative areas such as criminal justice 
and unemployment benefit. Taylor and Stanley write: ‘This 
begs the very important question as to whether this situation 
of fiscal imbalance actually serves to perpetuate the very 
socioeconomic conditions observed at Thamurrur in the first 
place.’34 
Taylor and Stanley’s research provides the data upon 
which irrefutable arguments for increased public spending 
on positive aspects of public policy in Indigenous affairs can 
be made. They argue that this spending must be primarily 
directed at positive public policy initiatives, namely, job 
creation and human capital formation. 
Law, order, authority and sustainability
Yet for all the persuasive detail of this COAG report, the 
Howard government continued to insist that ‘the crisis’ in 
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remote Aboriginal communities is not about money. Howard’s 
Minister for Health, Tony Abbott, for example, claimed that 
‘the basic problem of Aboriginal disadvantage was not a lack 
of spending but the directionless culture in which Aboriginal 
people lived’.35 This view was reinforced almost daily by 
editorials in the print media throughout May and June 2006. 
The crisis being narrated led to the conclusion that its solution 
lies with Aboriginal people themselves, and in the restoration 
of law, order and security. Aboriginal people, in these terms, 
must sort out their disorganised lives and take greater respon-
sibility for their circumstances. The problem of violence in 
communities—and here there is tacit acknowledgement that 
increased spending is required, albeit negative spending—is 
to be solved through an increased police presence in those 
communities.36 
If this narrative of crisis has been an easy political fiction 
to sustain, operating effectively to deflect from public atten-
tion the very active role of government in perpetuating the 
critical conditions of life in remote Aboriginal communities, 
it has also had the effect of making it difficult to conceive how 
those critical conditions might be transformed into a situation 
where lives and communities can be made sustainable beyond, 
of course, the proposals about improving individual and 
communal responsibility and increased policing. However, 
once again, there is research which, taken together with 
consideration of those factors that I have discussed so far—
tough-minded, empirically grounded understandings of the 
specific cultural bases of individual and corporate life in many 
remote communities, of the heterogeneity of governance and 
policy-making institutions and practices, and of the critical 
supporting fiscal and institutional role of the state —that is 
very suggestive of ways in which those communities and their 
residents can live socially and economically sustainable lives.
Jon Altman has argued that we need to extend our 
conception of what constitutes economic activity in remote 
Aboriginal communities beyond orthodox conceptions of the 
economy as the market economy, to include the full range 
of economic activity carried out in remote Aboriginal areas. 
When we do this, we see that there is a great deal of economic 
activity currently being carried out in remote areas populated 
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by Aboriginal people that is not recognised as such, and which 
produces very significant economic, environmental and social 
benefits. What is more, these economic, environmental and 
social benefits do not only devolve to Aboriginal communities 
but to the public and private sectors more generally.37 In other 
words, a broader conception of the economy reveals very 
broad national benefits generated by Aboriginal people.
Altman’s argument is based on the premise that the nar-
row conception of economic activity contained in the notion 
of the market economy should be extended to encompass the 
full range of economic practices and institutions in remote 
areas. This then includes: (1) the market, conceptualised 
as productive private sector activity; (2) the state, which is 
a provider of services and benefits; and (3) all customary 
economic activities. This last category, the customary, is based 
on traditional economic activity such as hunting, gathering 
and fishing, but also includes more recent innovations in 
these fields of practice such as land and habitat management, 
species management and the maintenance of biodiversity as 
well as artistic production. While Aboriginal people carry out 
all these activities as a matter of custom and tradition, they 
have also become involved in recent times in commercial and 
public sector applications of these practices. 
In doing so, however, the value of their labour is seldom 
recognised, nor is the productive benefit of this labour 
recognised or valued. If, however, the value of Indigenous 
labour and productive activity in the customary sector were 
recognised and accounted for, we would have a more accurate 
understanding not only of current levels of economic activity 
in remote communities, but also of the development potential 
of these communities. In addition to this, we would have 
an accurate account of the value that these communities 
add both to the market economy, the public sector and the 
national estate. Such a model of economic activity utterly 
contradicts the idea that remote Aboriginal communities are 
too costly and that some should be shut down.38
The links between the customary, market and state 
economies comprise what Altman calls ‘the hybrid economy’ 
of remote Aboriginal communities. By extending our concept 
of what constitutes economic activity in those remote regions 
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to include all three spheres of economic activity at work in 
those places—the market, state and customary—Altman 
argues that we have the (conceptual) framework around which 
it is possible to build institutions and practices of sustainable 
development.
Conclusion: Crisis, what crisis?
At one level, this has been an essay about the changes in 
Indigenous Affairs brought about by the Howard government 
during its decade in power, and about how these changes 
can be understood as being inextricably linked with a 
broader project of welfare reform—one which is not unique 
to Australia. This reforming project has conjured up anew 
ideas about the responsibility of citizens to the state, their 
communities and themselves. As a result, in place of the 
former welfarist conviction that the state was responsible for 
its disadvantaged citizens, the idea of citizen responsibility to 
the state now seems secure. In Australian Indigenous Affairs, 
this conviction has been translated more harshly into the idea 
that citizens can indeed fail their governments. Those who 
point to disorganisation, poverty, violence, unemployment, 
critically poor health conditions and lack of schooling, literacy, 
skills and viable economic activity in remote Aboriginal 
communities, are attempting to demonstrate the rightness of 
this conviction, but can only do so by ignoring the evidence to 
the contrary.
At another level, however, I have been concerned with 
the way in which government fails its citizens, specifically 
Indigenous citizens, not in the ‘symbolic’ terms that Howard 
rejected anyway, but precisely in the ‘practical’ terms 
developed by Howard and his leadership team. The failure of 
the Howard government to make any difference during this 
time to Indigenous socioeconomic indicators—the ‘practical’ 
goal identified by the government itself—is an assessment of 
that government’s legacy that receives little media coverage. 
The failure of Howard’s ‘quiet revolution’ has been very quiet 
indeed. The critical circumstances of daily life in many remote 
Aboriginal communities, instead of providing testimony to 
this failure, have instead been turned into something of an 
alibi, making the idea of a ‘crisis’ in those communities seem 
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utterly feasible. This idea of crisis, as narrated by the Howard 
government, naturalised a people and their circumstances as 
the product of moral deficit, deviance and even degeneracy. 
We have reached the point where ‘the crisis has begun to 
be lived in its terms’, not in the sense that we have all been 
duped, but in the way which this narrative of crisis, as Stuart 
Hall noted, does in fact ‘express real problems, real and lived 
experiences, real contradictions’.39  
Reflection
This essay was written at a time when public and political debate 
about the fundamental tenets of policy and practice in Indigenous 
affairs was making headlines, not just for weeks but for some years. 
I wrote the essay in an attempt to try and clarify the different 
strands of the debate at the time, to place them in historical con-
text and to calibrate the many arguments and assertions against 
relevant research, evidence and argument. The notion of ‘crisis’ as 
constituted through particular narratives (an analysis developed 
by the English political scientist, Colin Hay) seemed to me to be 
an apt way of thinking about the political and public construction 
of ‘failure’ in Aboriginal affairs at the time. That this ‘failure’ was 
narrated in normative terms and seen to lie almost entirely with 
Indigenous communities and individuals rather than being an-
chored in sociological and historical factors tied to profound fiscal 
neglect by governments signalled to me something deeper to do 
with the politics of Indigenous affairs in this country.
 I probably couldn’t have responded to this signal in this es-
say—the politics of the time were complex enough for me to discern. 
However, I regret that since then I have failed to pursue it. If I had, 
I imagine being led back to 1788 and beyond, to the long history of 
Anglo-European thought about the First People of this continent; 
an intellectual history that we know of today as having informed 
the development of those bodies of disciplinary knowledge that we 
as academics continue to work with and which today still shape 
and inform public discussion and debate in Indigenous affairs. 
Just to isolate out one brief quote I cited, let me revisit a claim 
made in 2006 by our current prime minister, then Minister for 
Health, Tony Abbott: ‘The basic problem of Aboriginal disadvan-
tage’, he claimed, ‘is not lack of spending but the directionless 
culture in which Aboriginal people live.’ How deeply embedded in 
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Australian law, politics and history is a statement such as this, and 
how embedded in the history of Anglo-European thought? This is 
an intellectual history in which Aboriginal people were said to lack 
civilised society, culture and religion, no less than they were said to 
lack politics, government and law, private property, free trade, and 
lives organised around capitalistic economic activity. On this read-
ing, there’s very little that separates the claim of the current prime 
minister, I believe, from this intellectual history. And underlying it 
all, are of course, the material facts of dispossession, of sovereignty 
denied, of the forcible removal of peoples from their lands to mis-
sions and reserves, and the subsequent legal reinvention of those 
same marginal lands since the 1970s as Aboriginal ‘communities’ 
held by Aboriginal land trusts. 
In mid-2014 the Abbott government handed down its first 
Budget. We learned that those ‘communities’ and the Aboriginal 
organisations, state and Commonwealth departments that service 
their chronically disadvantaged residents will have to manage 
(somehow) with budget cuts of $530 million across the Indigenous 
Affairs portfolio. Yet another crisis is surely in the making.
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